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Industrial Relations in Post-coup Fiji: a Taste of the 1990s 
Jacqueline Leckie • 
1990-1 brought a number of major disputes in Fiji's key industries which threatened 
to escalate. In 1991, the interim government revealed plans to drastically amend labour 
legislation that would introduce several limitations on the functioning of trade unions and 
their use of industrial action. The first round of seve~e restrictions was contained in the 
National Economy and Sugar Protection Decrees promulgated in May 1991. These were 
lifted but further decrees in November provided legislation to ,righten control over unions and 
their leaders. This paper places these changes against the economic restructuring in Fiji 
during the nineties but also emphasises the poUtical basis to this. 
Introduction 
The slogan, "Fiji the way the world should be" has since the events of 1987 lost much 
of its appeal except for perhaps the most diehard and naive tourists. Even staunch Fijian 
nationalists acknowledge that the country has been beset by economic and political turmoil. 
The state of industrial relations reflects dmstic restructuring, not only affecting the workplace 
but other aspects of working people's lives. Many of the patterns in Fiji's political and 
economic transfot mation reflect changes elsewhere, particularly as a result of the growing 
intemationalisation of capital and labour. Both proponents and opponents of Fiji's industrial 
and economic restructuring look to models and e~amples outside the Pacific Islands. Fiji's 
government may "see the country as becoming a modest South Pacific Singapore'' (Islands 
Business, March 1991, p.l6) but its critics point to the limited success of deregulation in New 
Zealand and Australia. Attempts to implement changes to the economy and labour relations 
in the island state have by no means been smooth sailing, even when the army was prepared 
to provide extra 'incentives'. Mov~es to transfotm Fiji's industrial climate have coincided with 
a period of deep-rooted political tensions, in which workers' organisations have been playing 
a crucial ~ole. 1 
Background 
Trade unions have been legal in Fiji since the introduction of the 1942 Industrial 
Associations Ordinance, which was designed to encournge the fotnlation of compliant rrade 
unions. There were however several instances of industrial unrest during the colonial period 
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(Leckie, 1990a). The period 1964-66 saw a flurry of legislation being passed to cover trade 
disputes, workmen's compensation, employment conditions and industrial training. Following 
in the wake of the disruptive 1959 oil workers' strike, the Trade Unions Act 1964 introduced 
compulsory registration for trade unions (Leckie, 1990a, pp.58-9). Similar to early British 
trade union legislation, it contained provisions inhibiting the fottnation of general unions. 
Militant industrial unrest also was averted through the somewhat uneven acceptance of power 
bargaining which brought wage increases and improved employment and living stan~ds for 
organised workers. 
A few years after independence in 1970 saw a growing new wave of industrial 
confrontation particularly as economic growth in Fiji began to slow (Cameron, 1988, pp.l-5; 
Leckie, 1988, pp.l39). In 1973 the passage of the Trade Disputes Act made it more difficult 
for workers to take industrial action, especially in essential services. Solidarity strikes were. 
also declared illegal. A wage freeze was also introduced, which subsequently gave way to 
wage guidelines. This process became negotiable in 1976 with the introduction of tripartism 
into Fiji's system of industrial relations. Comprising delegates from the national trade union 
body, the Fiji Trades Union Congress (F*I'UC), the Fiji Employers' Consultative Association, 
and government officials, the Tripartite Forum appeared to ofier an acceptable means of 
dispute solving. Unions came to criticise the Tripartite Forum's practice of establishing 
annual wage guidelines as a means through which employers treated the Forum as a body for 
imposing wage and salary restraints (Fiji Public Service Association, 1978). 
Since 1954 legislation has provided for wages councils to stipulate minimum wages 
and other conditions of service for low-income workers in specified industries such as 
manufacturing, building, retailing and hotel and catering. The bulk of Fiji's workers have 
remained outside even this basic protection as they work within what is loosely tet rned the 
'subsistence' or 'infotrnal' sectors or in family businesses. It is diffi.cult to detettnine accurate 
statistics for this, especially as a large number of women are classified as ",economically 
inactive" (Prasad, 1989, pp.3-11). A vast majority of women work in areas not covered by 
legislation providing for minimum wages and conditions and lack union representation. This 
particularly applies to paid domestic work which is one of the main occupations for ethnic 
Fijian and Indo-Fijian women. As discussed below, women have provided most of the labour 
for the booming garment industry but, until recently, without any statutory wage or union 
protection. 
The intensification of Fiji's economic problems during the early 1980s compounded 
a growing tense relationship between government and trade unions, particularly in the public 
sector which underwent prolonged and strained negotiations over salary increases 
(HowarcL1985; Leckie, 1990b). By November 1984 tripartism was put to rest with the 
Minister of Finance announcing a unilateral wage and salary freeze. Since the Fl'UC had not 
been consulted over this they withdrew from the Tripartite Forum for the duration of the 
freeze. Strains in Fiji's industrial relations became seriously acute with Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, the Prime Minister, threatening to declare a state of emergency and call on the anny, 
if the Fl'UC proceeded with a general strike (Fiji Times (FT) 10 January 1985). In June 1986 
the government withdrew recognition of the FI'UC as the national union body on the grounds 
that the the FI'UC had left the Tripartite Forum, although union sources suggested that 
government's underlying reason was because the Fl'UC decided in 1985 to sponsor the 
formation of an opposition political party, the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) (FT, 6 July 1986). 
While F·ruc representatives were still invit~ed to participate on various boards, committees 
and councils dealing with labour related matters (such as the Labour Advisory Board, the Fiji 
National Training Council and its training boards and the Wages Councils), government 
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extended representation to include unions not affiUated to the FI'UC (FI'UC 1990a, p.43) . 
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announced plans to follow IMF recommendations and introduce a value-added tax (VAT) of 
10 percent on several goods and services in July 1992. 
While the interim administration has been advocating deregulation of the labour 
market, it has not extended its avowed economic liberalisation to the activities of trade 
unions. A number of intended refo1 Ins to the labour l~egislation w~ere announced at the 1991 
NES summit which were aimed to deal with two faults Kamikamica identified: trade union 
immunity from prosecution for damages when acting outside the law and the internal 
functioning of trade unions. Suggested amendments to the Trade Unions Act were to 
encourage the development of company based unions and tighten up the procedures for 
detennining recognition of trade unions. Recommended changes to the Trade Disputes Act 
included a wider definition of a strike to include fo1ms of industrial action such as a go-slow, 
work-to-rule, or withdrawal of goodwill. Amendments to the Industrial Associations Act were 
designed to disallow industrial associations from acting as trade unions. This clear! y was 
aimed at restraining one of Fiji's strongest industrial associations, the National Farmers' 
Union (NFU), and curtailing the growing industrial muscle demonstrated by Fiji's newest 
industrial association., the Fiji Association of ~Garment Workers. 
Specific proposals which would effectively make trade union recognition, recruitment 
and organisation more difficult also included proposed amendments to the Trade Union 
(Recognition) Act to abolish the legal requirement for employers to deduct union dues from 
employees, the introduction of secret ballots and the introduction of time limits on the validity 
of strike ballots. 
The rationale for labour reform 
It is suggested that the administration's rationale for implementing labour refotnls 
stems primarily from their broader economic policy and deswe to curb trade union opposition 
to this. The aim of controlling trade union activities and, as many unions argue, to weaken 
them, is also part of an ongoing response to union opposition to the regime. Union 
opposition has not just been directed at employment matters, but has embraced broader 
political issues, such as the legitimacy of Fiji's new constitution. However motives for 
advocating refo1ms were couched in other reasons given by government ministers. To justify 
proposals to abolish minimum wages and wages councils, Vunibobo argued that employment 
opportunities would be generated which would help alleviate poverty. Poverty in Fiji has 
become a politically contentious issue with estimates of approximately 15-20 percent of Fiji's 
population in absolu~e poverty and a higher proportion considered to be in relativ~e pov,erty 
(Barr 1990). Kamikamica's case for labour refonn was presented in culturalist tenns: 
I see the biggest challenge now facing Fiji as being in the area of labour market refonn, 
where the cultural traditions of our ethnic groups here mingle with the cultural and 
ideological traditions of Europe in an often uncomfortable combination (NES papers 1991, 
p.l7). 
He then went on to say that "The challenge for government is to ensure an economic 
~environment in which competitive business can operate." 
This latter statement points towards the administration's more fundamental economic 
objectives, for which the restructuring of the labour market was deemed necessary. Official 
policy sought to encourage the growth of export production, and as discussed below, industrial 
unrest could threaten investment and production ·within the tax-free export sector. Workers 
had also shown, in the building industry, for example, that they would not take redundancies 
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consulted~ that the correct procedures to enforce the rates had been ignored and that the rates 
were too low. The minimum rate gives a net pay of $25 a week out of which workers, many 
being sole income earners for their families, would have to meet expenditure for food, 
housing, transport, electricity, water, children's education and other necessities (FT, 3 
November 1990). 
It is not surprising that with the continuation of wages frequently well below a basic 
poverty level of $72 a week or the estimated average national wage of $50 a week for an 
unskilled worker and with working conditions considered by many to be 'sweated,' that 
·workers both within and outside the garment industry have been agitating for better pay and 
conditions. A report by the Ministry of Employment and Industrial Relations (MEIR) found 
that almost two-thirds of surveyed factories paid less than 51 cents an hour and four-fifths 
avoided paying overtime (Cole, 1991 ). Esiteri Tuilovoni, Secretary of the Fiji Association of 
Garment Workers, confirms that even the minimum wages and conditions of the wages council 
are not being enforced This is particularly difficult to do when manufacturing is 
sub-contracted to family businesses or when employers transfer workers to another enterprise 
to avoid paying full-rates after the six month training period. Manufacturers also maintain it 
is often necessary to have long work-shifts if export deadlines are to be met. Other 
complaints, such as sexual harassment, are even more difficult to report and enforce. 
While such practices are still widespread, both the interim government and some 
·manufacturers have become somewhat more sensitive to the tarnished image that sweated 
labour can project abroad. In spite of an official delay of eight months, the Fiji Association 
of Garment Workers (FAGW) was fouually registered in 1989 and in 1990 had around 1152 
members (F*I'UC, 1990, p.94). Employer recognition has been even slower and rarely is 
considered until after garment workers have taken industrial action. 
The second half of 1990 saw a number of unprecedented strikes in which the FAGW 
was involved. In September 1990, 75 gauoent workers from an Austr,alian owned shirt 
ma1cing factory, Mark One Apparel, walked away from their machines because of 
management's failure to deliver promised pay increases or provide sick pay, and the alleged 
continuation of discriminatory bonus payments (FT, 4 September 1990). Mark Hellaby, the 
manager, argued that efficiency was low at the factory although workers suggested that if they 
were paid the same wages as his employees in Australia, their output would inCfease: "You 
give us the incentive and we'll give you the work ethic." After three days a compromise was 
reached over the pay increase. 
However in October 1990 a 15 day strike by approximately 400 workers at the Just 
Cham Garment Company (a joint venture with a New Zealand Company Alex Young) 
appeared to escalate with Ema Druavesi, past-Secietary of FAGW, threatening a national strike 
by garment workers, the Fl'UC threatening a boycott of the factory and the company warning 
that it would dismiss the strikers (FT, 20 October 1990; 22 October 1990). With wages 
averaging $20 a week, low pay was again a central issue, but the workers list of 24 grievances 
included complaints about inadequate toilet facilities, excessive overtime without extra 
payment or transport being provided, no annual leave, no tea breaks, excessively heavy work, 
no employer responsibility for accidents or sick leave and the practice of strip searching if any 
items went missing (FT, 10 October 1990). The FI'UC claimed that any worker who 
'Barr (1990) suggests this is the basic salary necessary to purchase a minimwn nutritious diet for a family of six and ensure 
basic necessities. He contends that mean wage rates overestimate the wages most workers receive, especially in the ' informal 
' sector . 
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people by unscrupulous industrialists" (FI', 17 November 1990). 
Although the intc1im ad•ninisaarion's policies and have 
resistance to unionisation and to i•nproved pay and cooditi0111 ill tile a--t 
industry, there hu been, following industrial unrest, son e t iB waps aad 
conditions within the gu•nent industry. Some employers, such u I ala of the 
Gu•nent Manufacturers' Association) have 1ecognised the FAOW IDd a collective 
apeement Many of the industrial disputes have been resolved throop conei1iation. 
Media attention has also put p~essme on the MEIR to · violatioDs of the Fiji 
Employnent Act and the Factories Act These have been applied paaticul•ly to 
of health and safety regulations and the illegal of won"'n in factories after 8pm. 
However, official willingness to take action on this hu been slow. For exa•nple, altboush 
MEIR confirmed complaints tbat female wo1kers fJom South Island Apparels were folaxl to 
work until 12.30am each night, officials avoided prosecution, arg11ing that it wu WIODI to 
move against one employer when others might be breaching the act. 1bc FI'UC claims that 
this employer should be so that the case could be a dete11ent: ''It clearly shows the 
anti-worker attitude of the Labour minisay and the fact that it is protecting the onployets" 
(Fiji labour Sentinel, March 1991). Instead the MEIR began a nationwide investigation into 
the hours of employ••aent of gu••cnt wmkers. 
• 
lnd••strial relations by decree 
On 29 May 1991 wo1kers and their union rep~esentatives in Fiji were not taken by too 
much smprise when the intm im administration announced the ponudgation of the Sugar 
Industry (Special Protection Amendn;cnt No 3) Decree 1991 and the Protection of the National 
Economy Decree 1991 (Fiji Republic Gazette 5 (37), I>ccrtu No. 18 ancl19). 
Although the inteiim adrninisbation's plans to daeplate the labour IDd 
introduce several neasures to conttol the operations of bade unions exar«bated the alalady 
smouldering discon1ent within Fiji's industrial relations, the severity of the sugar and 
decrees drew the most shock and condemnation and inaoducal the possibility of an 
con&ontation. While Decree No. 18 applied to the protection of all upccta of mpr 
production, No. 19 applied to the protection of the whole economy of Fiji, with 
reference to the protection of the tourism, copra, sugar, •ninin1, oil, 
teleco•••mnnications and electricity industries. Both decrees ~efer1ed to not only 
involved in hindering the ope1ation of these industties but also anyone "who 
or encourages a person to con unit any act or on Mission that ha• '"' the opc1ation of a 
industry which threatens or is likely to threaten the econonric life of Fiji" (Decree 19: 3(2)). 
Such responsibility was deen+cd to cover citizens within Fiji or abroad and residents witbia 
Fiji. The penalties? Trade union n-crnhers engaging in indust1ial action wbich aa 
industry f1om operating, could expect a fine of SFlO,OOO or a sentence of 14 years or boda, 
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calling for the maintenance of international trade union bans on Fiji. To the outside observer, 
sugar growers may appear to have different interests to industrial workers, but they have 
played a key role in Fiji's industrial climate and labour movement. Cane farming 
communiti~es, especially those of Indian descent, face considerable insecurity with land leases 
due to expire in 1997. Chaudhry's role as a linchpin between cane growers and other workers 
was strengthened by his election in 1988 as General Secretary of a more militant FI'U~C. He 
has also been General Secretary of the powerful FPSA since 1969. 
The framing of the 1991 Sugar Industry Decree was therefore aimed at not only 
inhibiting stoppages in the sugar industry but also counteracting the strong internal and 
international support the cane farmers had This did not deter Felix Anthony from threatening 
that his union, the Fiji Sugar General Wor~ers' Union, would take industrial action if cane 
was forcibly harvested or if cane farmers were intimidated by the police and other authorities 
(FT, 8 July 1991; 8 August 1991). With 2,000 members, this was the largest union in the 
sugar industry, ahead of the Fiji Sugar Tradesmens' Union, the Clerks' and Supervisors' 
Association and the union representing management staff, the Sugar Milling Staff Officers' 
Association. 
Confrontation between sugar workers and FSC management was exacerbated in July 
1991 when 1,000 workers were laid-off due to the lack of cane-supplies. At least a further 
1,000 mill-workers protested at this action by stopping work until the FSC agreed to 
compensate for lost wages. (FT, 4 July 1991). The Sugar Milling Staff Officers' Association 
took a somewhat ambivalent stand by supporting calls for a general strike, giving lukewarm 
support to the sugar wor~ers already on strike, yet also threatening industrial action among 
its field staff if they were intimidated by growers' organisations while preparing and 
organising sugar harvesting gangs (FT, 8 July 1991; 10 July 1991). 
The 1991 crisis in the sugar industry escalated with riot police being deployed to 
Western Fiji's cane districts and claims from NFU Rakiraki branch President, Marika 
Silimaibau, that police and district officers were pressuring farmers to harvest (FT, 1 June 
1991). Doubts about police and anny support for enforcing the decrees began to be raised 
after Fiji's President warned that soldiers might cut cane (FT, 5 June 1991). Although Ratu 
Viliame Tagivetu~ ·the District Officer of B~ cited the new sugar dec1ee to ban a proposed 
meeting of 10,000 farmers, Philip Amfield, the new Police Commissioner did not see it as 
illegal. While many farmers were intimidated from attending, a private meeting of 2000 NFU 
members called on government to revoke the dectees and resolved to seek solidarity from 
international trade unions (FT, 8 June 1991). The enactment of the decrees increased local 
awareness and support for the cane farmers original grievances. A similar patt~ern dev~eloped 
in Fiji's troubled goldmining industry . 
Industrial relations 'underground': the Vatukoula dispute 
On 4 June 1991 the Fiji Timl!s ran an advertisement for Taniela Veitata, the Minister 
of Employment and Industrial Relations, in which he ~described Kavekini Navuso, the ~General 
Secretary of the recently registered Fiji Mine Workers Union (FMWU) as "like a man 
possessed". This battle of words fought in the newspapers was ov~er Navuso's efforts to gain 
voluntary recognition for the FMWU by the Emperor Goldmining Company (managed by a 
former Australian shareholder, Western Mining Company). Refusal to grant recognition in 
Fiji's fourth biggest export indusay led to union members going on strike on 23 February 
15 
1991 (Ff, 28 Feblnary 1991). 
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grievances relating to employment and living conditions" (FI', 16 July 1991). The FMWU 
later agreed to seek compulsory recognition but insisted that first govetnment appoint a 
conciliator. This stand was taken because the union had "no confidence in the ministry's 
impartiality" (Fl', 16 July 1991). By August 1991, the MEIR finally recognised that an 
industrial dispute existed but still refused to recognise the FMWU as the legitimate 
representative of the strikers. Emperor Goldmining continued to boycott conciliation meetings. 
Official views, as with the industrial unrest in the gm n M?nt and sugar industries, also 
dismissed the mining strike as being politically motivated. Veitata suggested that the strike 
was prolonged intentionally by Navuso and suppmters in the FLP/NFP. Coalition to coincide 
with the sugar harvesting boycott "as pan of their concened efforts to destabilise the country" 
(FI', 4 June 1991). Union officials have not denied that there is a deep-seated political basis 
to this dispute but they have thrown the ball in the other coun, pointing to long-standing 
political links between Emperor Goldmining and sone members of the current regime (Fiji 
14bour Sentinel, March 1991). 
The often-bandied bogey of indigenous Fijian domination by supposedly power-hungry 
Indian unionists has not been applicable to the go]dmining dispute, as most of the miners are 
ethnic Fijians. Public support for their plight was strengthened when, at the miners' request, 
Methodist church leaders intervened to assist in reaching a solution. Rabuka also made it 
clear that he would not allow the army to be used against the strikers. The long duration of 
the strike would not have been possible without food and financial assistance from local and 
overseas unions and other suppotters in Fiji. As with the sugar decree, the District Officer 
of Ba also decided to invoke provisions of the decree by barring the FMWU from mounting 
a public appeal in his district (Fl', 1 June 1991 ). 
Dealing with officialdom 
The disputes outlined in this paper reveal the difficulties in resolving industrial conflict 
through the established industrial relations channels. Long before the coups, major unions, 
such as the FPSA, accused management and govetument ministries of deliberate slowness in 
resolving grievances and disputes (l~kie, 1988, pp.162-4). This has been compounded since 
the coups, not only because of the incteased politicisation of official intervention in industrial 
relations, but due to personnel shonages and the resignation of experienced senior labour 
officers. 
Since the coups several unions have complained of the MEIR's reluctance to enforce 
collective agieements and the rejection of disputes without any valid reasons being given 
(FIUC, 1990, p.56). Frustrated workers have two main options: taking strike action or 
entering into expensive and even more time consuming litigation through the High Coun. 
The FfUC has also complained of the MEIR's bias towards employers. Alternatively 
when arbitration awards have been in the union's favour, this has been challenged by 
employers through judicial reviews. This delays any settlement being reached and has 
compelled unions to dip into their often limited funds to meet legal expenses. · As noted, 
delays in enforcing labour related legislation have been especially prevalent in the rapidly 
expanding garment industry. The FAGW has also criticised labour officers' bias against 
workers registering complaints. Most garment workers who ue prepared to repon a grievance 
to the Ministry have ftrSt to overcome shyness and fear of victimisation by employers. 
Druavesi claimed that the MEIR was inconsistent in its criteria for accepting or rejecting a 
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and the proposals to inttoduce VAT and labour refot•ns. Although the proposed strike was 
declared illegal by the administration, it drew suppon from non-FI'UC unions, with the 
exception of some ethnically based and pro-Taukef' unions. 
Besides the threat of local industrial action the ¥,.....-rue called upon international 
affiliates for suppon. Such measures have been a powerful card the FI'UC has played since 
the coups (Leckie, 1991). Vanderveken, General Secretary of the ICFI'U was quick to 
condemn what he regarded as an erosion of workers' rights, particularly because Fiji's interim 
administration had "specifically and unequivocally agteed" to ICFI'U missions during 1988 
and 1989 not to make any changes to existing trade union legislation and to abide by the 
relevant international and ILO conventions (FT, 10 July 1991). In a letter to Ratu Mara he 
warned that the ICFI'U and the European Tmdes Union Congress were recommending that 
the European Community suspend all economic aid to Fiji. International affiliates of Fiji's 
trade unions were highly likely to impose ttade and communication bans if repressive 
legislation was put into practice to resolve the industrial crisis. 
Pressure from workers within and outside Fiji was critical in the administration having 
to shelve the National Economy Protection decrees. Following a meeting held on 12 July 
between Chaudhry, Columbus, Rabuka and Gaunilau, the unions agteed to lift the strike threat, 
while the President stated that a conference would be held to settle the sugar dispute, that the 
decrees would be suspende<L and an attempt would be made to resolve the Vatukoula dispute. 
Agteement was also reached to refer details of the labour refot m changes and VAT to a 
tripartite meeting of the Labour Advisory Board. 
This resolution was g~eeted by many unions as a victory for workers, particularly after 
government also announced that it would restore recognition of the FI'UC as the national 
union body. However few of the agteements reached on 12 July were implemented. By early 
1992, the Vatukoula dispute remained unresolved. It seems likely VAT will be introduced in 
1992. The interim government proceeded with its plans to introduce labour refotms, now with 
greater suppon from Fiji's employers' associations (FT, 2 September 1991, 6 November 
1991). This was a departure from indications before 1991 when many employers endorsed 
F·ruc calls for a comprehensive review of labour legislation along the lines of an ILO 
sponsored (the Drake) report. The lack of resolution within the sugar industry precipitated the 
NFU into holding a strike during 5-7 November, just after the interim government 
promulgated dectees announcing labour refotms as outlined at the 1991 NES (Fiji Republic 
Gazette, 5(77), 1 November 1991). The new refm•ns also clearly aimed to weaken 
Chaudhry's powerful role, by prohibiting an office holder from serving in more than one union 
or industrial association.5 Plans to abolish wages councils were shelved, although employers' 
organisations are pushing for a review of their operations (FT, 6 November 1991). 
Again, the see-saw pattern of post-coup industrial relations was set in action, with the 
FI'UC unsuccessfully seeking dialogue with the Ptime Minister, pursuing international 
solidarity suppon and threatening a general strike in February 1992. Both fotms of industrial 
action are illegal under the November decrees. 
4rfhe Taukei refers to the indigenous people of Fiji but here it refers to the Taukei Movement, a group which took an extreute 
stand on the primacy of indigenous political domination. This led to efforu to destabilise the Coalition govenuuent before 
the 1987 coup. 
SOther provisions, besides those outlined in this paper with regard to the 1991 NES, included the requirement of a secret 
ballot under close goveunnent '"t*rvilion before takin& strike ~etion. lnduslrial action. includina seeking ove"Zseas support 
is only legal if votes are cut for this by 50 percent of the union membership. The ballot is valid for six weeks. Certain 
categories of employees are ~evented &ona forming or joinin& union. Penaltiea for breach of the new decrees are a $2,000 
fine or 12 months imprisonment and those convicted may be barred nona being a trade union official for two years. 
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